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THE COSTS OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
LYDIA ZEPEDA* 
INTRODUCTION 
Four United States immigration policies—Muslim bans, family 
separations, mass detentions, and mass deportations—will go down in 
history as shameful, destructive to our national reputation, and lethal to 
immigrants.  These policies have broken up families; sent people to 
countries they may have no family or roots in, where they may not even 
speak the language; and resulted in extortion, torture, and even death. 
While the above ethical costs of U.S. immigration policies are 
apparent to some, the financial costs go largely unrecognized.  For the 
fiscal year 2019 (“FY”), the budget requested by the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) to apprehend, detain, and remove 
unauthorized immigrants was over $30 billion.1  The budgets for 
apprehension and enforcement have focused on illegal border 
crossings, which are at a 48-year low.2  Meanwhile, the numbers of 
legal immigrants and those entering legally and later invalidating their 
right to stay in the U.S. have grown.  In FY 2018, the number of people 
who were suspected of being illegally in the U.S. due to overstaying 
their visas was 569,604.3  This is over 200,000 more than the number 
of border crossings along the southwest border in 2017.4  Customs and 
                                                          
*    Professor Emerita, University of Wisconsin-Madison. lzepeda@wisc.edu. 
1. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF (2018),   
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf.   
2. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS 91, 95 (July 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/yearbook_immigration_statistics
_2017_0.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK].  
3. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2018 ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY 
REPORT 10, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0417_fy18-
entry-and-exit-overstay-report.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).  
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 95.  
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Border Protection (“CBP”) picked up 310,531 people5 and estimated 
the number of undetected unlawful entries at the southwestern border 
at 57,000 for FY 2017.6  Yet the problem of illegal overstays has been 
ignored and the U.S. policy focus is on “border security.” 
In practice, U.S. immigration policies target unauthorized 
immigrants who are Mexican and Central American rather than the 
larger group of unauthorized immigrants who are from elsewhere.  This 
article examines these immigration trends, the priorities of 
enforcement, and the economic costs of U.S. immigration policies. 
I. WE ARE AT A 48-YEAR LOW IN ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSINGS 
A widely-shared misconception is that the U.S. borders are being 
overrun by undocumented immigrants.  In reality, illegal border 
crossings are the lowest they have been since 1969.7  The number of 
border apprehensions by CBP—the government catching an 
unauthorized immigrant entering the U.S. illegally—was only 310,531 
in FY 2017.8  Although over 98% of these apprehensions occurred 
along the U.S.-Mexico border,9 only 42% of those apprehended were 
Mexican.10  Further, these unauthorized immigrants are not “sneaking” 
into the U.S.  Forty-four percent of those the CBP apprehended along 
the U.S.-Mexico border in FY 2017 were apprehended in the Rio 
Grande Valley (“RGV”) sector:11 a populated, highly-patrolled 320-
                                                          
5. Id.  
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
BORDER SECURITY METRICS REPORT 14 (2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ndaa_border_metrics_report_fy
_2018_0_0.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER SECURITY 
METRICS REPORT].   
7. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 91.  
8. Id. at 95. 
9. Id. 
10. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. BORDER PATROL NATIONWIDE 
APPREHENSIONS BY CITIZENSHIP AND SECTOR IN FY2017 2–3, 
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2018-May/usbp-
apprehensions-citizenship-sector-fy2017.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).  
11. Id. at 2; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY BORDER SECURITY METRICS REPORT, supra note 6, at 21.  
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mile section along the U.S.’s nearly 2,000-mile border.12  Many of those 
apprehended in the RGV in FY 2017 (53.5%) were members of family 
groups or unaccompanied minors.13  Over 50% of those apprehended 
were from Northern Triangle countries (Honduras, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador), and 18% of all those apprehended in the RGV had claims of 
“credible fear.”14 
Why then do many Americans believe that the U.S.’s southern 
border is being overrun by undocumented immigrants?  Dramatic 
fluctuations in the flow of unauthorized immigrants have contributed to 
this inaccurate perception of illegal border crossings.  The number of 
apprehensions was 45,336 in 1959, they climbed to over one million in 
1976, and reached nearly 1.8 million in 1986.15  The numbers stabilized 
at about one million per year for the next five years, then climbed again 
to about 1.8 million in 2000.16  Since 2000, apprehensions by CBP have 
fallen markedly to a little over 300,000 annually.17  Thus, as the 
numbers show, the flood of illegal entries into the U.S. happened twenty 
years ago: not today. 
Apprehensions are strongly correlated with “returns” plus 
“removals” (Figure 1).  “Returns” are confirmed departures of 
deportable or unauthorized immigrants that were made without a court 
                                                          
12. See Christopher Klein, Everything You Need to Know About the Mexico-
United States Border, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/everything-you-need-
to-know-about-the-mexico-united-states-border (last updated Dec. 26, 2018); see also 
Rio Grande Valley Sector Texas, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., 
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/border-patrol-sectors/rio-
grande-valley-sector-texas (last updated May 17, 2016).  
13. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER SECURITY METRICS REPORT, 
supra note 6, at 24–25.  
14. Id. at 21; U.S. Border Patrol Claims of Credible Fear Apprehensions by 
Sector, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-
border-migration/claims-fear/apprehensions-sector (last updated Oct. 23, 2019).  
15. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 91.  
16. Id.  
17. Id. at 91, 95.  
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order.18  “Removals” include what are commonly called deportations,19 
expedited removals,20 and inadmissible entries (persons who seek 
admission to the US by fraud or misrepresentation of fact).21 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, removals were few 
relative to returns, and stable (under 40,000 per year).22  In contrast, 
returns fluctuated wildly between 1927 and 2000, from 6,531 to almost 
1.7 million (Figure 2).23  Removals began to increase after 1996, the 
year  Congress changed the laws to allow expedited removals.24  The 
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(“IIRIRA”) expanded the application and use of expedited removals.  
One can conclude that the increased priorities and budgets of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to deport “criminal” 
aliens contributed to the rise of removals, which peaked in 2013.25  As 
                                                          
18. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, DHS 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: 2016 2, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20Immigration%20Enfor
cement%202016.pdf (on file with author). It includes voluntary departures (no bar to 
re-entry at a port of entry but failure to leave in time allotted results in a ten year bar 
to entry), voluntary returns, and withdrawals under docket control. Id.  
19. Id. Deportations are ordered by an immigration judge. Id. The U.S. 
Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) operates 
immigration courts. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).  
20. Fact Sheet: Expedited Removal, NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM (June 4, 
2019), https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-expedited-removal/ 
[hereinafter NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, Fact Sheet]. Deportations authorized by the 
1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act allow DHS to 
deport without an immigration judge’s order. Id.  
21. Bryan Baker, ANNUAL REPORT DECEMBER 2017, IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 5–6, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2016.pdf. 
22. Table 33. Aliens Apprehended: Fiscal Years 1925 To 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2014/table33 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2019). 
23. Table 39. Aliens Removed or Returned: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2017, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.  https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-
statistics/yearbook/2017/table39 (last visited Dec. 20, 2019) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., Table 39].  
24. See id.; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, Fact Sheet, supra note 20.  
25. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Table 39, supra note 23.  
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one can see from Figure 2, removals have remained above returns since 
2011.26  Indeed, removals were more than double returns in FY 2015: 
326,962 versus 129,429.27  The rise in removals means that more people 
have been deported from the U.S. between 1997 and 2015 than were 
deported in all years prior to 1997.28  Deportations peaked under Obama 
in 2013 at 433,000; in FY 2017 only 230,000 were deported.29 
While returns declined in the early 2000s, the biggest drop occurred 
after the 2008 financial crisis.30  This decline in returns is due in part to 
the large decrease in unauthorized immigrants crossing the border to 
begin with.31  This is clear from the fact that apprehensions have fallen 
despite huge increases in budget and staffing for Customs and Border 
Protection (“CBP”).  Furthermore, more aggressive enforcement by 
ICE, like by increasing the use of expedited removal, may have reduced 
the number of immigrants who voluntarily return home and resulted in 
more expensive removals.  In addition, an increasing number of those 
crossing the border are asylum seekers who fear for their lives in their 
own countries, and therefore are unlikely to return voluntarily. 
Given the fall in illegal border crossings and increasing number of 
asylum seekers, in-land arrests by ICE are making up a larger 
proportion of removals.32  The subjects of inland arrests tend to be 
unauthorized immigrants who have been living in the U.S. for some 
time.33  A substantial number of these arrests are made by state and 
                                                          
26. Id.  
27. Id.  
28. Tanya Golash-Boza, The Parallels Between Mass Incarceration and Mass 
Deportation: An Intersectional Analysis of State Repression, 22 J. WORLD-SYSTEMS 
RES. 484, 484–85 (2016) [hereinafter Golash-Boza, Mass Incarceration and Mass 
Deportation].  
29. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips 
to Lowest Level in a Decade, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2018/11/27/u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-
total-dips-to-lowest-level-in-a-decade/ [hereinafter Passel & Cohn, Unauthorized 
Immigrant Total Dips].  
30. See Table 39, supra note 23. There was an approximately 30% drop in 
returns from 2008 to 2009, and about 20-30% declines each year after, except in 2014. 
See id.  
31. Passel & Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips, supra note 29.   
32. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 95.  
33. Kevin Sieff, The U.S. Sends Thousands of Deportees Each Month to 
Mexico’s Most Dangerous Border Areas, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2019), 
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local law enforcement who cooperate with ICE as part of Section 287(g) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).34  In 2008, one-third 
of those deported from the U.S. interior were arrested through 
cooperative agreements with state and local law enforcement.35 
DHS used to publish estimates of the number of unauthorized 
immigrants living in the U.S.36  Their last estimate that was made public 
was for January 2012; it was 11.4 million.37  The unauthorized 
population appears to have peaked in 2007 at 11.8 million.38  DHS 
estimated that 86% of this population had been in the U.S. for more than 
seven years, only 59% was of Mexican origin, and that 79% of this 
population was concentrated in ten states, with 25% residing in 
California.39  DHS researchers explained the declining population: 
It is unlikely that the unauthorized immigrant population has 
increased since 2007 given relatively high U.S. unemployment, 
improved economic conditions in Mexico, record low numbers of 
apprehensions of unauthorized immigrants at U.S. borders, and 
greater levels of border enforcement.40  
 
It is clear from this passage that DHS recognizes that there is no 
flood of immigrants across the border.  In fact, it is just the opposite: 
we are at a 48-year low.41  Since the 2012 DHS report, 
apprehensions have fallen even further, suggesting that even fewer 
                                                          
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/the-us-sends-thousands-of-
deportees-each-month-to-mexicos-most-dangerous-border-
areas/2019/01/07/bbe4036e-ff45-11e8-a17e-162b712e8fc2_story.html.  
34. Tanya Golash-Boza & Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Latino Immigrant Men 
and the Deportation Crisis: A Gendered Racial Removal Program, 11 LATINO STUD. 
271, 278 (2013) [hereinafter Golash-Boza, et al., Latino Immigrant Men].  
35. Id. at 279–80.   
36. See Bryan Baker & Nancy Rytina, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant 
Population Residing in the United States: January 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC. 3 (Mar. 2013), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Unauthorized%20Immigrant%2
0Population%20Estimates%20in%20the%20US%20January%202012_0.pdf.  
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
39. Id. at 3–5.  
40. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
41. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 91, 95.  
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unauthorized immigrants are crossing the border.42  Interestingly, 
DHS stopped publishing data on the number of unauthorized 
immigrants in the U.S. in 2012, precisely when illegal border 
crossings decreased.43 
II.  U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES TARGET MEXICANS AND  
CENTRAL AMERICANS 
While DHS has stopped publishing its estimates, estimates by the 
Pew Research Center corroborate past DHS studies, indicating that the 
unauthorized immigrant population has continued to decline.44  Pew 
researchers estimate that the number of unauthorized immigrants from 
Mexico declined by two million from 2007 to 2017.45  They estimate 
there were 10.7 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States 
in 2016, a decrease of 13% since 2007.46  Over one million of these 
unauthorized immigrants have temporary protection under Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) or Temporary Protected 
Status (“TPS”) that could be rescinded.47  Pew researchers confirmed 
DHS’s past findings that the undocumented immigrant population is 
concentrated in a handful of states.48  They also found that the 
proportion of the undocumented population that is Mexican has fallen 
to 50%, that 66% of the adult population had lived in the U.S. for more 
than ten years, and that Mexicans are three times as likely as other 
unauthorized immigrants to have lived in the U.S. for more than five 
years.49 
                                                          
42. Id.  
43. See Baker & Rytina, supra note 36.  
44. See Jynnah Radford, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, Fact Tank, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (June 17, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/05/03/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/.  
45. Id.  
46. Passel & Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips, supra note 29.  
47. Id.  
48. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts About 
Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/5-facts-about-illegal-
immigration-in-the-u-s/.  
49. Id.  
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In light of (1) the dramatic decline in unauthorized immigrants 
crossing the U.S.’s southern border, and (2) the fact that more Mexicans 
are leaving the U.S. than entering it (Figure 3), anti-Mexican 
immigration rhetoric (“build a wall, have Mexico pay for it”) lacks any 
factual basis and is transparently racist.  Still, U.S. immigration policy 
has the effect of targeting Hispanics and ignoring other unauthorized 
immigrants.  For example, in 2013, the policy of expedited removal 
almost exclusively affected Mexicans, Guatemalans, Hondurans and 
Salvadorans: in FY 2013, these groups represented 98% of those placed 
in expedited removal.50  In FY 2017, over 90% of all removals were 
from Mexico and the Northern Triangle.51 
As mentioned above, along with a decline in illegal border 
crossings, the number of those crossing in a legal way, by seeking 
asylum, has increased.52  Between 2000 to 2009, there were about 5,000 
asylum claims per year.53  There were a little over 50,000 asylum claims 
in FY 201454 and just over 48,000 in FY 2015.55  In FY 2018, there 
were 264,945 claims and 38,687 were granted asylum.56  While claims 
take some time to adjudicate, the asylums granted in FY 2018 represent 
14.6% of the number of applications.  Older sources indicate that about 
49% of those who applied for asylum received it.57 
                                                          
50. Elizabeth Cassidy & Tiffany Lynch, Barriers to Protection: The Treatment 
of Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 13 (2016), https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/ 
Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf.  
51. Katherine Witsman, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2017 9 (2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/enforcement_actions_2017.pdf.  
52. Cassidy & Lynch, supra note 50, at 14.  
53. Id. 
54. Id.  
55. Id. at 34, n.42. 
56. Nadwa Mossaad, Annual Flow Report October 2019, Refugees and Asylees: 
2018, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 1, 6–7 (2019), https://www.dhs. 
gov/sites/default/files/images/OIS/2018/refugees_asylees_2018.pdf.  
57. Sharita Gruberg, How For-profit Companies Are Driving Immigration 
Detention Policies, TUCSONSENTINEL (Dec. 22, 2015), 
http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/opinion/report /122215_detention_policy/how-for-
profit-companies-are-driving-immigration-detention-policies/  
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Thirty-nine percent of the asylum applications in FY 2018 were 
from the Northern Triangle: Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.58  
The rise in Central Americans coming to the U.S. is because they are 
fleeing violence and gang activity.59  Almost 40% of asylum seekers 
are fleeing to escape direct threats against them and/or their family, 
forced gang recruitment, and/or extortion.60  The violence in these 
countries stems from the huge numbers of firearms that were imported 
to the region during civil wars between 1960 and 1991, many of which 
were provided by the U.S. and its allies.61  This and corruption, 
economic instability, and U.S. policies and practices have allowed 
gangs to thrive.62  The U.S. provides more small arms and ammunition 
to Central America than any other country and many are sold by corrupt 
Northern Triangle officials to gangs.63  This endemic violence in the 
Northern Triangle is why, in 2014 and 2016, the number of people from 
the Northern Triangle (henceforth referred to as Central Americans) 
surpassed the number of Mexicans who entered the U.S. without 
authorization (Figure 4).64  They are fleeing despite the huge cost to 
                                                          
58. Mossaad, supra note 56, at 6.  
59. Sarah Bermeo, Violence Drives Immigration from Central America, 
BROOKINGS INST. (June 26, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-
development/2018/06/26/violence-drives-immigration-from-central-america/.  
60. Carmen Rodriguez, Forced to Flee Central America’s Northern Triangle: 
A Neglected Humanitarian Crisis, MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (2017), 
https://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/msf_forced-to-flee-central-americas-
northern-triangle_e.pdf. 
61. See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL 
ORGANIZED CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A THREAT 
ASSESSMENT 59 (2012), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf.  
62. Amelia Cheatham, Danielle Renwick & Rocio Cara Labrador, Central 
America’s Turbulent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June 26, 
2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle.  
63. Alex Yablon, U.S. Gun Makers Send Weapons South as Migrants Flee 
North, TRACE (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.thetrace.org/2019/03/american-gun-
exports-violence-latin-america-colt/.  
64. The situation was made worse during the 1990s when the U.S. deported 
gang members from Los Angeles who were able to exploit the fragile Northern 
Triangle states and their prevalence of weapons. These gang members set up quasi-
state organizations for extortion and drug trafficking. They use violence to force 
recruitment into their gangs and extort payments from the populace. In 2015, it was 
estimated that the people of the Northern Triangle paid $651 million in extortion 
9
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reach the U.S., up to $12,000 per person,65 which is several times the 
per capita annual income in each of the Northern Triangle countries.66 
While illegal border crossings get all the attention, the number of 
unauthorized immigrants who entered the U.S. legally and overstay 
their visas has been largely ignored.  It is estimated there were 700,000 
overstays in FY 2017 compared with 310,000 border apprehensions.67  
In other words, there were more than twice as many unauthorized 
immigrants who overstayed their visas than who crossed the border 
illegally.  Still, neither the money, the rhetoric, nor the immigration 
policies have targeted this much larger population of unauthorized 
immigrants.  While 95% of those apprehended crossing the border are 
from Mexico or Central America, ninety percent of overstays are from 
elsewhere.68  Thus, ignoring overstays and focusing on “border 
security” allows immigration policy to target Mexicans and Central 
Americans for apprehension and removal, while ignoring a 
proportionally much larger problem consisting of a class of 
unauthorized immigrants from other parts of the world. 
This lopsidedness is reflected in immigration detention as well: 
data for FY 2015 indicated that 89% of those detained were Mexicans 
and Central Americans.69  This focus of immigration policy 
enforcement on Mexicans and Central Americans, to the exclusion of 
other unauthorized immigrants, has occurred against a backdrop of a 
rise in the U.S. Hispanic population.  For instance, the 2017 U.S. 
Census estimates indicated that the Hispanic population had reached 
                                                          
money to gangs. Julian Borger, Fleeing a Hell the US Helped Create: Why Central 
Americans Journey North, GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/19/central-america-migrants-us-
foreign-policy?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other. 
65. Id. 
66. GDP Per Capita, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).  
67. Passel & Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips, supra note 29 
(“Apprehensions at the border do not exactly match attempts at unlawful entry, but 
enforcement officials and researchers view them as an indicator of entries.”).  
68. Id.  
69. Emily Ryo & Ian Peacock, The Landscape of Immigration Detention in the 
United States, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/landscape-immigration-
detention-united-states.  
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just under 18% of the U.S. population.70  Hispanics are the largest 
minority group in the U.S.71  There are 43% more Hispanics than non-
Hispanic African Americans, and 329% more Hispanics than Asian 
Americans.72  Given that nearly one in five Americans is Hispanic, 
Hispanics are vastly underrepresented in politics,73 business,74 the 
media,75 education,76 and many other venues of power. 
The hyperbole regarding border crossings also diverts attention 
from the dramatic rise in legal immigration.  The number of legal 
temporary workers and their family members in the U.S. in FY 2017 
was 3,969,276, while the number of people captured by CBP trying to 
illegally enter the U.S. in FY 2017 was 310,531.77  In other words, more 
than ten times that of unauthorized immigrants.78  Furthermore, this is 
a long-term trend.  The number of foreign-born people in the U.S., i.e. 
immigrants, has grown steadily to over forty-four million in 2017; since 
the population of unauthorized immigrants has declined since 2007,79 
this growth is entirely due to legal immigration.  The number of 
unauthorized immigrants fell to 3% of population80 and 23% of all 
                                                          
70. ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates 2013-2017 American 
Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=C
F (last visited Nov. 10, 2019). 
71. Id.  
72. Id.  
73. See Ronny Rojas, et al., The Latino Struggle to Reach Public Office, 
UNIVISION (Oct. 13, 2016, 11:43 a.m.), https://www.univision.com/univision-
news/the-latino-struggle-to-reach-public-office.  
74. See Missing Pieces Report: The 2016 Board Diversity Census of Women 
and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards, DELOITTE. (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/center-for-
corporate-governance/us-board-diversity-census-missing-pieces.pdf. 
75. See Darnell Hunt, et al., Hollywood Diversity Report 2018: Five Years of 
Progress and Missed Opportunities, UCLA COLL. OF SOC. SCI., 
https://socialsciences.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/UCLA-Hollywood-
Diversity-Report-2018-2-27-18.pdf.  
76. Amanda Fernandez, Closing the Latino Leadership Gap, FUTUREED (Feb. 
5, 2018), https://www.future-ed.org/closing-the-latino-leadership-gap/.  
77. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 66, 95.  
78. See id.  
79. Radford, supra note 44.  
80. Id. 
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immigrants.81  The number of legal permanent residents during this 
period has remained at about 1.1 million per year.82  Naturalizations 
peaked at over one million in 2008 and fell to around 700,000 in 2017, 
while temporary workers and their families have climbed from 1.9 
million to over three million between 2008 and 2017.83 
U.S. refugee policies have also targeted specific populations.  For 
instance, in FY 2018, 45,000 was the annual cap on refugee admissions, 
and less than half this number were admitted: 22,405.84  Despite a 
global refugee crisis that has forcibly displaced 70.8 million people,85 
only 22,405 refugees were allowed into the U.S. in FY 2018.86  The 
number of Muslim and Latin American refugees the U.S. let in was 
down 90% and 40%, respectively, and only sixty-two Syrians refugees 
were allowed in.87  The U.S.’s already miserly refugee cap has been 
further reduced by a third for FY 2019: the cap is now 30,000 and is set 
to be reduced to 18,000 in FY 2020.88 
III.  THE COST OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
The costs of implementing U.S. immigration policy have risen 
dramatically with the advent of the specific goals of excluding 
Mexicans, Central Americans, and Muslims.  The DHS’s FY 2019 
budget request was $74.4 billion, a 7.3% increase over FY 2018.89  
DHS has three units focused on unauthorized immigrants:90 (1) 
                                                          
81. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 5.  
82. Id.  
83. Id. at 52, 63.  
84. Mossaad, supra note 56, at 2.  
85. Figures at a Glance, UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE AGENCY, 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).  
86. Mossaad, supra note 56, at 2.  
87. Deborah Amos, 2018 Was a Year of Drastic Cuts to U.S. Refugee 
Admissions, NPR (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/27/680308538/2018-was-a-year-of-drastic-cuts-to-u-s-
refugee-admissions.  
88. Id.; Priscilla Alvarez, US Sets a Refugee Cap of 18,000 for Next Year—A 
New Historic Low, CNN (Sept. 26, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/26/politics/refugee-cap-historic-low/index.html.  
89. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 1, 
at 1.  
90. See generally id.  
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Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”) administers immigrant 
and non-immigrant benefits;91 (2) Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”) is responsible for apprehending unauthorized aliens who enter 
between Ports of Entry and up to 100 miles from the border;92 and (3) 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arrests in-land 
undocumented immigrants and any immigrant who has violated the 
terms of their visa or permanent residency.93 
Between FY 2002 and 2013, the budgets of CBP and ICE, which 
deal with apprehension and detention, tripled.94  Meanwhile, the budget 
for the office that runs the immigration courts, the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”) in the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), 
increased by only 70%.95  This disproportionate allocation of funds to 
apprehension and detention over adjudication meant that by the end of 
August 2014, the immigration courts had 456,644 pending individual 
removal cases that had been waiting an average of 635 days.96 
Providing another example of where the government’s priorities 
lie, DHS spends more on CBP than on the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (“FEMA”), despite an increase in both the 
number of natural disasters and the costs of responding to them.97  
Natural disasters cost the U.S. $307 billion in 2017.98  The priority of 
spending on the border “emergency” over actual emergencies affecting 
Americans was illustrated when DHS transferred $10 million from 
FEMA’s budget to ICE for detention and removal in 2018.99 
                                                          
91. Id. at 70–72.  
92. Id. at 25–26; see also ACLU, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION’S 
(CBP’S) 100-MILE RULE 1, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/ 
13_08_01_aclu_100_mile_cbp_zone_final.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).  
93. See id. at 32–35.  
94. See Cassidy & Lynch, supra note 50, at 15.  
95. Id.  
96. See id.  
97. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 1, 
at 26, 61; Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Overview, NAT’L CTRS. FOR 
ENVTL. INFO., https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/.  
98. Kimberly Amadeo, Natural Disasters’ Economic Impact: Natural Disasters 
Are a Bigger Threat than Terrorism, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/cost-of-
natural-disasters-3306214 (last updated June 25, 2019).  
99. Ron Nixon, $10 Million from FEMA Diverted to Pay for Immigration 
Detention Centers, Document Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), 
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The FY 2019 budgets for CBP, ICE and CIS are about $16.7 billion, 
$8.8 billion, and $4.7 billion, respectively.100  They total approximately 
$30.2 billion: this money is used to apprehend and detain immigrants, 
and enforce and administer immigration laws.  By comparison, DOJ 
EOIR’s requested a budget of $563 million to adjudicate immigration 
cases.101  This amounts to 1.7% of the combined budgets of CBP, ICE, 
and CIS. 
Features of the FY 2019 DHS budget include: $1.6 billion for sixty-
five miles of border wall in the Rio Grande Valley corridor; 750 
additional Border Patrol Agents; 2,000 additional ICE law enforcement 
officers; 1,312 ICE support personnel; $2.8 billion for 52,000 detention 
beds (49,500 adults and 2,500 family beds); and over a half a billion 
dollars to transport and remove detainees.102  The cost of the sixty-five 
miles of border wall works out to $4,662 per foot of wall.103  The cost 
of detention averages over $145 per night, per bed.104 
A.  The Cost of Border Apprehension 
The sharp drop in the number of unauthorized immigrants 
attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border has been accompanied by 
an astronomical rise in the average cost of apprehensions.  While CBP 
does more than just apprehend individuals crossing the border, the 
trends in its staffing and budget illustrate how costs have risen.  In FY 
2017, CBP’s apprehensions per Full-Time Equivalent employee 
(“FTE”) were 5.3, at a cost of $12,254 per apprehension.105  Using CBP 
                                                          
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/us/politics/fema-ice-immigration-
detention.html.  
100. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 1, 
at 11.  
101. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2019 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE 3, 
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1033086/download (last visited Dec. 21, 2019) 
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2019 BUDGET].  
102. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 1, 
at 3–4.  
103. See id. at 3.  
104. See id. at 4.  
105. Id. at 88; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, 
at 95; United States Border Patrol: Budget History: 1990-2017, NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
FORUM, https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/BP-Budget-
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budgets over time illustrates the rise in the costs of apprehension.106  In 
FY 1990, the average cost per apprehension was $225.107  Costs rose to 
$581 in 2000, and leapt to $12,254 by FY 2017.108  This implies that 
the increase in average apprehension costs between FY 1990 and FY 
2017 is 5,446% (Figure 5).109  Comparing this average cost of $13,803 
per apprehension to the per capita annual income of Mexico ($9,698), 
El Salvador ($4,058), Guatemala ($4,549), Honduras ($2,482),110 we 
are spending between about 1.3 to nearly 4.9 times the average annual 
income of an unauthorized immigrant simply to apprehend them. 
The average cost per apprehension has risen for two reasons.  First, 
there simply are not that many immigrants attempting to cross the 
border.  Second, Congress continues to allocate more money to Border 
Patrol.111  Rather than focus on a real problem, like those outstaying 
their visas or the immigration court backlogs, Congress throws money 
at a problem that occurred twenty years ago. 
Looking at the border crossings numbers, it becomes clear that, not 
only are fewer people crossing, but apprehensions are getting easier.  
The apprehensions are concentrated in a small portion of the border and 
increasingly, those apprehended are women and children; specifically, 
about half of all border apprehensions occur along the 320 mile Rio 
Grande Valley (“RGV”) sector of the U.S.-Mexican Border.112  Over 
70% of the women and nearly three-quarters of the juveniles crossing 
the U.S.-Mexican border cross at RGV.113  In 2014, females made up 
one-third of all RGV apprehensions by Border Patrol as contrasted with 
                                                          
History-1990-2017.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2019) [hereinafter NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
FORUM, Border Patrol Budget].  
106. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, Border Patrol Budget, supra note 105.  
107. See id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra 
note 2, at 91.   
108. Id.  
109. Id.  
110. WORLD BANK, supra note 66.  
111. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, Border Patrol Budget, supra note 105.  
112. Guillermo Cantor, Hieleras (Iceboxes) in the Rio Grande Valley Sector: 
Lengthy Detention, Deplorable Conditions, and Abuse in CBP Holding Cells, AM. 
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL 5, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/ 
sites/default/files/research/hieleras_iceboxes_in_the_rio_grande_valley_sector.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2019).  
113. Id.   
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a 16% average for the entire Mexican border.114  During this time, 31% 
of the apprehensions at RGV were juveniles versus 12% across the 
entire Mexican border.115  In 2017, 38.5% of all CBP’s apprehensions 
were families and unaccompanied minors.116  CBP’s increasing budget 
does not seem justified in light of the fact that there are fewer border 
crossings, and where they do still happen, they are concentrated along 
a short portion of the border where large percentages of those crossing 
are women and children. 
The rising costs of apprehensions can be contrasted against the 
relatively inexpensive cost of immigration proceedings: the average 
cost of EOIR per completed case was only $2,696 in FY 2017 and this 
fell to $2,234 in FY 2018.117  This begs the question, why should it cost 
five to six times the amount to apprehend someone as to try them? 
B.  The Cost of Detention Policies 
In 1958, the Supreme Court ruled that detention should be the 
exception, not the rule, regarding unauthorized immigrants.118  The 
mass emigration of 125,000 Cubans to the U.S. in 1980, known as the 
Mariel boatlift, changed the practice of detention policy in the U.S.119  
To avoid another Mariel boatlift, the federal government planned to use 
detention as a deterrent, especially against Haitians, all of whom were 
detained by 1981.120  Again, the implementation of U.S. immigration 
policy is highly racialized; the Marielitas, as well as the Haitians, were 
                                                          
114. Id.  
115. Id.  
116. Southwest Border Migration FY2017, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration-fy2017 (last visited Dec. 
21, 2019).  
117. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2019 BUDGET, supra note 101, at 3; see also 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK FISCAL YEAR 2018 7, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/ 
download (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).  
118. Ana Raquel Minian, America Didn’t Always Lock up Immigrants, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/01/opinion/sunday/border-
detention-tear-gas-migrants.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype= 
Homepage (quoting Leng v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).   
119. Id.  
120. Id.  
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largely non-white.121  Detention policy continues to be highly racialized 
and gendered today, targeting Mexicans and Central American men. 
Public monies being spent on detention are just as misguided and 
wasteful as the money being spent on apprehensions.  By way of an 
example, in 2009, nine years into a dramatic decline in border crossings 
and despite DHS data that showed that the unauthorized immigrant 
population was falling, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), inserted a 
detention mandate into ICE’s budget requiring ICE to maintain 33,400 
detention beds and increased ICE’s budget to cover the costs of the 
quota.122  Given the dramatic drop in unauthorized border crossings and 
the increasing number of asylum seekers, the only way to fill the quota 
was to go after people already in the U.S. and asylum seekers.123  In 
other words, the quota effectively forced immigration enforcement to 
focus on these people. 
In 2013, the bed quota was increased to 34,000.124  In FY 2017, it 
was reduced to 30,913.125  The FY 2019 budget called for 52,000 
beds.126  DHS estimated it costs about $126/day/bed for an adult and 
$161/day/bed for a family detention.127  Thus, a bed quota of 31,000 
costs U.S. taxpayers $2.2 billion per year.128  It should be noted that 
there is no evidence that the people being detained would not appear at 
their court hearings—the compliance rate in immigration court is above 
90%.129 
                                                          
121. See id.  
122. Lydia Zepeda, The High Cost of U.S. Immigration Policy: Putting US 
Agriculture at Risk, 2 APPROACHES POULTRY, DAIRY & VETERINARY SCI. 185, 185 
(2018), https://crimsonpublishers.com/apdv/pdf/APDV.000549.pdf.  
123. Id.  
124. Bethany Carson & Eleana Diaz, Payoff: How Congress Ensures Private 
Prison Profit with an Immigrant Detention Quota, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP (Apr. 
2015), https://grassrootsleadership.org/reports/payoff-how-congress-ensures-private-
prison-profit-immigrant-detention-quota#1. 
125. Jennifer Chan, Immigration Detention Bed Quota Timeline, NAT’L 
IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/ 
staff/blog/immigration-detention-bed-quota-timeline.  
126. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 1, 
at 4.  
127. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FY 2017 38 (2018),  
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY2017BIB.pdf.  
128. Id. at 5.  
129. Cassidy & Lynch, supra note 50, at 48. 
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The effect of the bed quota along with the 1996 AEDPA and 
IIRIRA laws is that we have six times the number of people in detention 
as before these took effect.130  In FY 1994, the average daily number of 
people detained was 6,785.131  This number climbed to about 20,000 by 
FY 2000 and remained around there until FY 2007, when it jumped to 
around 30,000.132  In FY 2017, it was 38,106:133 23% above the quota 
mandated by Congress.134 
As the number of detentions have increased, so have their costs.  
Using the FY 2019 ICE budget, detention costs an average of $52,990 
per person per year.135  Detaining a single individual for one year costs 
57% more than what half of Americans earn each year.136  The Census 
Bureau’s latest estimate for the median U.S. income was $33,706 per 
person.137 
Detention costs are steep for the detainees’ families as well.  
Sources from five to nine years ago indicated that half the men in 
detention had children, one quarter of deportees were parents of U.S. 
citizens, and 5,000 children a year were put into foster care due to 
deportations.138  Detained fathers cannot provide financial support for 
their families, leaving their families in poverty and increasing demand 
for state and federal services.  In addition to economic strife that reduces 
assets and resources, these families face deleterious psychological and 
                                                          
130. See id.; see also Ryo & Peacock, supra note 69.  
131. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 69.  
132. Id.  
133. Id.  
134. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET IN BRIEF FY 2017, supra note 
127, at 38; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra 
note 1, at 33.  
135. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 
1, at 36.  
136. PINC-01. Selected Characteristics of People 15 Years and Over, by Total 
Money Income, Work Experience, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-
poverty/cps-pinc/pinc-01.html.  
137. See id.  
138. Golash-Boza, Mass Incarceration and Mass Deportation, supra note 28, 
at 497–98. 
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social impacts, like depression, stress, social isolation, and lack of trust 
in the police and other government services.139 
U.S. immigration policies also have indirect costs on the U.S. 
economy in terms of lost workers and tax revenues.140  For example, 
researchers estimate immigrants provide over half of all labor on dairy 
farms and that eliminating their labor would reduce both milk output 
and the number of dairy farms, that U.S. economic output would fall by 
$32.1 billion, and that over 200,000 jobs would be lost.141  Meanwhile, 
deportations have created incentives for businesses to leave the U.S. to 
exploit a cheap workforce of deportees.142  For example, the Mexican 
state of Baja California has about 35 call centers serving the U.S. that 
employ nearly 10,000 people, who typically earn a little less than $150 
a week to start.143  Forty-five percent of these workers are deportees.144  
In addition, it is estimated that undocumented immigrants pay around 
$12 billion in taxes and this would increase by about $2 billion were 
they to have legal status.145 
IV.  WHAT ARE WE GETTING FOR OUR MONEY? THE USE OF FOR-
PROFIT AND COUNTY AND STATE FACILITIES FOR DETENTION 
Given that in 2017 71% of those in ICE custody were held in 
privately-operated facilities and 29% were held in jails by local 
                                                          
139. Jodi Berger Cardoso, et al., Deporting Fathers: Involuntary Transnational 
Families and Intent to Remigrate Among Salvadoran Deportees, 50 INT’L MIGRATION 
REV. 197, 204–05 (Spring 2016). 
140. See David P. Anderson, Flynn Adcock & Parr Rosson, Texas A&M 
University, Address at the USDA Outlook Conference: The Economic Impacts of 
Immigrant Labor on U.S. Dairy Farms (Feb. 23, 2017).  
141. Id.  
142. Id.  
143. See Elliot Spagatomar Millan, Deported Mexicans Find New Life at Call 
Centers in Tijuana, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 23, 2014), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/deported-mexicans-find-new-life-at-call-
centers-in-tijuana/.  
144. Id.  
145. Adding up the Billions in Tax Dollars Paid by Undocumented Immigrants, 
AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Apr. 4, 2016), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/adding-billions-tax-dollars-
paid-undocumented-immigrants.  
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governments,146 the bed quota is effectively a transfer of money from 
the U.S. government to private, for-profit prisons, local jails, and state 
prisons with spaces to rent.  In 2015, ICE used 638 different facilities 
to detain immigrants, with at least one in each state.147  In 2016, 65% 
of those detained by ICE were held in private, for-profit prisons; 25% 
were held in local jails and state prisons, often with the rest of the 
general prison population; and only 10% were held in federally-run 
prisons.148 
The federal government views the use of for-profit prisons for 
federal prisoners as problematic, but has not registered these concerns 
for detained immigrants.  In August 2016, the Justice Department 
announced the end to the use of private contract prisons for federal 
prisoners.149  That same month, DHS announced a no-bid, four-year, $1 
billion contract with private contractor Corrections Corporation of 
America (“CCA”) for immigration detention.150  Under this contract, 
CCA receives $20 million each month whether or not any of the 2,400 
beds are occupied.151  ICE avoided an open bid process by arranging 
                                                          
146. Tara Tidwell Cullen, ICE Released Its Most Comprehensive Immigration 
Detention Data Yet. It’s Alarming., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/ice-released-its-most-comprehensive-
immigration-detention-data-yet.  
147. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 69.  
148. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY 
COUNCIL REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZED IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
FACILITIES 6 (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
DHS%20HSAC%20PIDF%20Final%20Report.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., PRIVATIZED IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES].   
149. Aviva Shen, The Problem with the DOJ’s Decision to Stop Using Private 
Prisons, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 18, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/the-federal-
government-is-not-actually-ending-private-prisons-40e8c8dbf976/#.cmjxrwpn2. In 
2014, 8% of the federal prison population was housed in for-profit prisons. Id.  
150. Id. 
151. Eric Levitz, The Obama Administration’s $1 Billion Giveaway to the 
Private Prison Industry, INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 15, 2016), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/08/obamas-usd1-billion-giveaway-to-the-
private-prison-industry.htm; see also Chico Harlan, Inside the Administration’s $1 
Billion Deal to Detain Central American Asylum Seekers, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/inside-the-
administrations-1-billion-deal-to-detain-central-american-asylum-
seekers/2016/08/14/e47f1960-5819-11e6-9aee-
8075993d73a2_story.html?utm_term=.d555c41c857b.  
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 56 [], No. 1, Art. 16
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/16
Zepeda camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/4/2020  10:31 AM 
2019] THE COSTS OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES 223 
two separate contracts: one between ICE and the city of Eloy, Arizona 
where CCA operates a detention facility, and another between the city 
of Eloy and CCA.152  ICE pays Eloy, Eloy passes the money onto CCA, 
and Eloy retains less than 2% in administrative fees.153  In June 2017, a 
CCA facility in Dilley, Texas with an ICE contract to house asylum-
seeking women and children had only 600 occupants.154  Since ICE 
pays CCA the same whether any beds are occupied or not, this means 
that ICE paid CCA $1,111 per person per night to hold them.155  
Already the most profitable of CCA’s seventy-four facilities, providing 
14% of its revenue in 2015,156 this contract has ensured even greater 
profits for CCA (renamed CoreCivic).157 
A DHS subcommittee examining the use of contracts with private 
corporations and state and local facilities justified their use as more 
flexible than federal facilities in accommodating fluctuating numbers 
of unauthorized immigrants.158  They also claimed private detention is 
more cost-effective than federally-run facilities.159  However, their 
calculations of $144.23 per person per day for private versus $184.35 
per person per day for federal facilities160 presumably were based on 
contracts that pay only for those beds used, not for flat-fee contracts, 
like the one made with CCA for a facility in Dilley, Texas, or with 
Emerald Correction Management LLC in Alvarado, Texas.161  Emerald 
did not negotiate quite as good of a rate as CCA: it receives $89.25 per 
day per bed for a minimum of 525 beds, regardless of whether those 
                                                          
152. Harlan, supra note 151.  
153. Id.  
154. E-mail newsletter from CARA Pro Bono Project to author (June 26, 2017) 
(on file with author).  
155. Id.; see also Harlan, supra note 151.  
156. See Harlan, supra note 151.   
157. Bethany Davis, Corrections Corporation of America Rebrands as 
CoreCivic, CCA (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.correctionscorp.com/insidecca/ 
corrections-corporation-of-America-rebrands-as-corecivic.  
158. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVATIZED IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION FACILITIES, supra note 148, at 7.  
159. Id. at 9.  
160. See id. 
161. See Harlan, supra note 151; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
PRIVATIZED IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES, supra note 148, at 1.  
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beds are filled.162  The calculation of “cost-effectiveness” also fails to 
take account of the fact that immigrants detained in for-profit detention 
centers are detained significantly longer than those who stay at federal 
state or county facilities.163  On average, detainees in for-profit 
detention centers are detained 82% longer than those of similar 
characteristics who are detained in other facilities.164 
Despite the alleged rationale of cost savings, a DHS subcommittee 
admitted constitutional scruples in utilizing for-profit detention centers: 
“Because legitimate restriction on physical liberty is inherently and 
exclusively a governmental authority, much could be said for a fully 
government-owned and government-operated detention model.”165  
The committee also admitted that the lack of oversight and mixing 
detainees with the general population of county jails was even worse 
than for-profit detention in terms of how detainees are treated: 
County jails are, in general, the most problematic facilities for 
immigration detention. Because most of them are mixed-use 
facilities primarily handling county detainees in the criminal-justice 
process, such facilities often will not accept the full range of detailed 
detention standards that ICE has developed . . . [O]fficials operating 
such county facilities . . . do not wish to have sharp differences in 
treatment for different categories of detainees (ICE vs. local) held at 
the same facility.166 
The problematic use of non-federal facilities is corroborated by 
findings at Gadsen County jail in Gadsen, Alabama.167  There, officers 
sold contraband to detainees in the form of alcohol, drugs, and cell 
phones.168  Despite these problems with the use of for-profit and state 
                                                          
162. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVATIZED IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION FACILITIES, supra note 148, Appendix C at 96.  
163. See Ryo & Peacock, supra note 69.  
164. Id.  
165. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVATIZED IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
FACILITIES, supra note 148, at 5.   
166. Id. at 7–8.  
167. Id.  
168. See Khushbu Shah, Etowah: The Ice Detention Center with a Goal to 
‘Make Your Life Miserable,’ GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/02/etowah-the-ice-detention-
center-with-the-goal-to-make-your-life-miserable?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.  
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 56 [], No. 1, Art. 16
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/16
Zepeda camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/4/2020  10:31 AM 
2019] THE COSTS OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES 225 
and county facilities, ICE reduced the number of detainees in federal 
facilities from 1,600 to only 3 detainees between June and October of 
2018.169  Detention (and oversight) in federal facilities is all but extinct. 
Private detention facilities are highly profitable.  In 2017, 
CoreCivic and Geo Group reported a combined revenue of $4 billion.170  
They are guaranteed “clients” and, in some contracts, they are paid 
whether they provide services or not.171  As though guaranteed profits 
are not enough, private prisons exploit the labor of detainees, many of 
whom are unable to work legally in the United States.172  The practice 
of using the labor of detainees can be traced back to DOJ rulings on 
internment camps from 1943.173  However, most of the Japanese-
Americans who were interned were U.S. citizens and therefore could 
legally work in the U.S.174  Hiring an undocumented immigrant is a 
violation of federal law.175  However, the practice of paying detained 
immigrants for their work was codified in the 1950 Immigration Service 
expenses law.176  While the law requires that the wage rate be adjusted 
periodically, it is common practice that immigrants today are still paid 
one dollar a day for their work while in detention.177 
                                                          
169. Conrad Wilson, ICE Appears to End Use of Federal Prisons for Immigrant 
Detainees, NPR (Oct. 20, 2018 6:01am ET), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/20/658988420/ice-appears-to-end-use-of-federal-
prisons-for-immigrant-detainees. 
170. Amanda Holpuch, Private Prison Companies Served with Lawsuits over 
Using Detainee Labor, GUARDIAN  (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/nov/25/private-prison-companies-served-with-lawsuits-over-usng-
detainee-labor?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.  
171. Harlan, supra note 151. 
172. See Holpuch, supra note 170.  
173. See generally Jacqueline Stevens, One Dollar Per Day: The Slaving Wages 
of Immigration Jail, from 1943 to the Present, 29 GEO. IMMIGRATION L. J. 391, 391 
(Spring 2015). Internment camps run by the Department of Justice paid workers who 
were interned 80 cents a day. Id. at 391.  
174. Japanese Internment Camps, HISTORY (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/japanese-american-relocation.  
175. Ilona Bray, Legal Rights of Undocumented Immigrants, LAWYERS.COM, 
https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/immigration/general-immigration/legal-rights-
of-illegal-immigrants.html.  
176. Act of July 28, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-626, 64 Stat. 380–81 (codified as 
Immigration Service Expenses 8 U.S.C. § 1555 (2019)).  
177. See generally Stevens, supra note 173. Class action suits have been filed 
for wage theft or forced labor against CoreCivic facilities in New Mexico and 
23
Zepeda: The Costs of U.S. Immigration Policies
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
Zepeda camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/4/2020  10:31 AM 
226 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
Even more problematic is the detention of children in for-profit and 
“non-profit” prisons.  For instance, Southwest Key Programs (“SKP”) 
earned $626 million in government contracts in 2018.178  The non-profit 
houses more immigrant children than any other organization.179  At any 
given time, the organization houses up to 5,000 children in twenty-four 
shelters.180  In 2017, SKP’s founder, Juan Sanchez, paid himself $1.5 
million, his wife $500,000, and his friend and CFO, Melody Chung, $1 
million.181  They also use the non-profit to make lucrative deals with 
themselves.182  Sanchez and Chung rent shelter space to SKP at above 
market rates.183  In addition, SKP paid $117,000 per month to rent a 
facility that advertised rent at $30,000 a month, and lent $6 million to a 
pair of developers to buy and renovate a Walmart as a shelter, then SKP 
paid the developers $5 million a year to rent the space.184  Beyond their 
highly questionable financial dealings, SKP has been fined for child 
abuse, failed to meet a deadline to provide proof of employee 
background checks, and has agreed to close two shelters in Arizona 
because of “numerous red flags and licensure problems.”185 
V.  WHAT ARE WE GETTING FOR OUR MONEY? BORDER  
HOLDING FACILITIES 
Border Patrol’s holding facilities are designed to detain people for 
twenty-four hours or less,186 yet the average holding time is about two 
                                                          
Georgia, a wage theft suit was filed against Geo Group in Colorado, and Washington 
State has filed a suit against Geo Group for paying detainees $1/day. Holpuch, supra 
note 170.  
178. Kim Barker, Nicholas Kulish & Rebecca R. Ruiz, He’s Built an Empire, 
with Detained Migrant Children as Bricks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/02/us/southwest-key-migrant-
children.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage. One of 
the shelters is a former Walmart that can hold up to 1,410 children. Id.  
179. Id.  
180. Id.  
181. Id.  
182. Id.  
183. See id.  
184. Id.  
185. Id.  
186. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN DHS MANAGEMENT OF SHORT-
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days in the “hieleras.”187  “Hieleras” are 15’ x 10’ concrete rooms that 
are kept so cold that their given name translates to “icebox.”188  In 2013, 
three-quarters of those detained in the RGV sector reported extremely 
cold temperatures, and while 96% said they received a foil blanket, 
100% said it was not sufficient to stave off the cold.189  Detainees often 
arrive wet and most of their personal items, such as coats and hats, are 
taken from them.190  At any given time, there may be as many as 40 
people in a hielera where they must share an open toilet.191  There is 
not enough room to lie down, and in terms of where the detainees sleep, 
it is on concrete floors.192  Detainees in the RGV reported that lights are 
kept on twenty-four hours a day and the detainees are woken 
periodically during the night for head counts.193  Ninety-nine percent of 
detainees in the RGV said the food was insufficient.194  Detainees 
reported that when they ask for food, blankets, or medical care they 
were ignored, denied or punished.195  Women complain they are 
separated from male children older than eleven or twelve; that their 
babies are left unclothed; that there is a lack of sanitation, soap, food, 
and privacy; that any medicines they had are thrown away; and that 
children become sick due to the cold.196  Most complaints made by 
individuals are not made while they are in Border Patrol custody, but 
rather after they have been transferred to ICE custody in a detention 
facility.197  After the hielera, most detainees are transferred to the 
                                                          
TERM HOLDING FACILITIES 2 (May 2016), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677484.pdf.   
187. See Cantor, supra note 112, at 4.  
188. See id. http://themostimportantnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ 
Illegal-Immigration-Holding-Center-450x337.jpg. 
189. Id. at 10.  
190. Interviews with detainees at South Texas Family Residential Center in 
Dilley, Texas (Jan. 10–15, 2016, Jan. 6–13, 2017).  
191. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 186, at 2.  
192. See infra Figure 6.  
193. Cantor, supra note 112, at 12.  
194. Id. at 13. 
195. Id. at 13, 15.  
196. See generally id.  
197. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 186.   
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“perreras,” the dog kennels.198  These are cages over a concrete floor.  
The temperatures are not as cold as the hieleras and detainees are given 
pads to sleep on.199 
CBP’s official position in 2008 was that a detainee should not be 
held for more than 12 hours in the hieleras.200  In October 2015, CBP 
changed the time limit policy to 72 hours.201  What did not change—
CBP facilities.  At the Rio Grande Valley CBP facility during the 
August through December 2013, 1,173 individuals were detained for an 
average of 41.1 hours.202 
After being held by CBP, immigrants may then be released, 
released on bond, moved to detention facilities, or removed.203  Asylum 
seekers are interviewed by ICE to determine if they have a “credible” 
fear as a basis for their asylum claim; a negative determination means 
being returned to their home country, a positive determination means 
they may be allowed to stay to pursue an asylum request.  However, 
ICE has not applied its criteria for parole of asylum seekers in 
Expedited Removal with positive credible fear determinations in a 
consistent manner.204  For example, New Orleans released only 0.5% 
of asylum seekers, while Harlingen released 98%.205 
                                                          
198. https://hips.hearstapps.com/hmg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/images/ 
gettyimages-458329266-1529609058.jpg?crop=1xw:1xh;center,top&resize=480:* 
199. Interviews with detainees, supra note 190.  
200. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. BORDER PATROL POLICY: 
DETENTION STANDARDS 3 (Jan. 31, 2008), https://www.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/818095-bp-policy-on-hold-rooms-and-short-term-custody.html.   
201. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 
PROTECTION NATIONAL STANDARDS ON TRANSPORTATION, ESCORT, DETENTION, 
AND SEARCH 14 (Oct. 2015), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/ 
documents/2017-Sep/CBP%20TEDS%20Policy%20Oct2015.pdf. 
202. Cantor, supra note 112, at 6. An average of 212 (18%) individuals were 
held longer than 72 hours. In 2014, the RGV was where most of the women (70.1%) 
and juveniles (74.1%) crossed. Id.  
203. Rafael Carranza, What Happens to People Caught Crossing the Border?, 
AZCENTRAL (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/border-
issues/2017/09/20/what-happens-people-caught-crossing-border/647052001/; How 
Immigration Bail Bonds Work, ABOUTBAIL (last visited Dec. 22, 2019), 
https://www.aboutbail.com/pages/how-immigration-bail-bonds-work.  
204. Cassidy & Lynch, supra note 50, at 46. 
205. Id.  
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VI.  ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES AND ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION 
REDUCE COSTS 
Currently, unauthorized immigrants are not entitled to legal 
representation and because most detention facilities are located in 
remote, rural areas, this makes it difficult to access legal services.206  
However, access to legal services actually reduces detention costs.207  
The immigration proceedings of ICE detainees who participated in 
Legal Orientation Programs (LOPs carried out by NGOs) were 
accelerated by an average of 12 days when compared to those who did 
not participate in LOPs.208  Using FY 2017 DHS budget estimates of 
roughly $126 per day for detention,209 LOPs would save ICE $1,512 in 
detention costs per adult, and $3,864 for a family of two appearing in 
court together.210  Compare this to the average cost of adjudicating 
immigration cases by EOIR.  In FY 2018, EOIR had a budget of $505 
million211 and completed 195,696 cases.212  Using this data, the cost per 
completed case was $2,580 in FY 2018.  This implies that LOPs save 
ICE roughly 59% to 150% of what it costs to adjudicate immigration 
cases.  Given there were 795,566 pending EOIR cases in FY 2018,213 
increased access to LOPs could free up money desperately needed to 
reduce EOIRs caseload. 
Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”) also reduce costs of 
immigration policies by providing much cheaper alternatives to 
detention, with nearly 100% compliance rates.214  ICE’s primary ATD 
                                                          
206. Id. at 52.  
207. Id. at 51–52.  
208. Id. at 52.  
209. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FY 2017, supra note 
127, at 38.  
210. See id.; see also Cassidy & Lynch, supra note 50, at 46. 
211. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2020 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE 3, 
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/file/1142306/download (last visited Dec. 22, 
2019). 
212. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS, NEW CASES AND 
TOTAL COMPLETIONS (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/ 
1060841/download. 
213. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS, PENDING CASES (Oct. 
7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1060836/download. 
214. Cassidy & Lynch, supra note 50, at 48.  
27
Zepeda: The Costs of U.S. Immigration Policies
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
Zepeda camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/4/2020  10:31 AM 
230 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
program involves either electronic monitoring only, or electronic 
monitoring plus community-based supervision provided by 
contractors.215  For FY 2016 through February 29, 2016, ATD programs 
resulted in an appearance rate of 99.45 at a cost of only $4.45 per person 
per day.216  This compares to FY 2017 estimates of detention of $126 
per day per adult and $161 per day per person for family detention.217  
Detention costs twenty-eight to thirty-six times the cost of ATD to 
achieve about one-half of one-percent improvement in appearance 
rates.  Whatever the ethics or constitutionality of detention, it is not a 
rational or cost-effective use of public monies. 
VII.  POLICIES ARE NOT TARGETING CRIMINALS NOR ARE 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS TAKING JOBS 
In theory, ICE’s number one priority is to deport criminals.218  
However, using ICE’s own statistics, the only crime committed by 85% 
of the immigrants removed or detained was attempting to enter the 
United States unlawfully.219  Of the 450,954 removals and detentions 
in FY 2016, less than 2% of the unauthorized immigrants can be 
classified as dangerous.220  By comparison, as of 2010, 8% of adults in 
the U.S. had a felony conviction.221  In other words, on average, 
undocumented immigrants are far less dangerous than U.S. citizens. 
In fact, it appears that most unauthorized immigrants are simply 
parents trying to support their kids.222  7.6 million of the 10.5 million 
unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. in 2017 were in the workforce.223  
                                                          
215. Id.  
216. Id.  
217. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FY 2017, supra note 
127, at 38.  
218. See id. at 34–37.  
219. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, DHS 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: 2016, supra note 18, at 6. 
220. See id. at 6. 0.18% was suspected of being a national security threat and 
1.8% had committed an aggravated felony. Id.  
221. Sarah K.S. Shannon, et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of 
People with Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 
1814 (October 2017).  
222. See Krogstad, et al., supra note 48.  
223. Id.  
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Meanwhile, five million U.S. children have at least one undocumented 
parent,224 and another 700,000 children are themselves undocumented, 
living with undocumented parents.225 
Illegal immigration is often blamed for taking jobs.  However, the 
percentage of the workforce made up of undocumented immigrants has 
declined from a peak of 5.4% in 2007 to 4.6% in 2017.226  Moreover, 
undocumented immigrants work mostly in low-paying jobs that, while 
they have difficulty attracting American workers, are crucial to many 
sectors of the economy.  These jobs are largely in agriculture, 
restaurants, hospitality, and construction.227  For example, in 2016, it 
was estimated that up to 75% of farmworkers228 and 15% of 
construction workers were undocumented.229  Talk to any farmer and 
they will tell you: they cannot find American workers to fill these 
jobs.230 
Contrast the hue and cry over undocumented workers who work 
primarily in low-paying jobs that Americans will not take with the 
approximately four million temporary workers and their families in the 
U.S. in FY 2017.231  The number of legal workers and their families in 
the U.S. in FY 2017 was more than ten times the number of people 
apprehended at the U.S. southern border for entering illegally that 
                                                          
224. Passel & Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips, supra note 29.  
225. Id.  
226. Id.; Krogstad, et al., supra note 48.  
227. TANYA MARIA GOLASH-BOZA, DEPORTED: IMMIGRANT POLICING, 
DISPOSABLE LABOR, AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 15 (2015). 
228. Timeline of Agricultural Labor: Farm Workers and Immigration, NAT’L 
FARM WORKER MINISTRY & YOUTH & YOUNG ADULT NETWORK, 
http://nfwm.org/farm-workers/farm-worker-issues/timeline-of-agricultural-labor/ 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2019).  
229. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Size of U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant 
Workforce Stable After the Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2016/11/03/size-of-u-s-unauthorized-
immigrant-workforce-stable-after-the-great-recession/.  
230. Yet few farmers apply for temporary H-1A work visas. These visas would 
increase farm expenses because they would require farmers to pay their workers more 
than they currently pay on average. Lydia Zepeda, The High Cost of US Immigration 
Policy: Putting US Agriculture at Risk. 2 APPROACHES POULTRY, DAIRY, & 
VETERINARY SCI. 185 (2018), http://crimsonpublishers.com/apdv/pdf/ 
APDV.000549.pdf. 
231. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 65.  
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year.232  So, if anyone is taking good paying jobs away from Americans, 
it is workers here legally on temporary visas.  These are jobs Americans 
actually want: high paying, technical ones.  H1-B visa holders earned 
an average of $80,600 per year between 2010 and 2016,233 compared to 
the median salary during that period of $26,363 to $30,553.234  
Meanwhile, H2-A holders must be paid between $11.71 and $15.83 per 
hour depending on the state,235 and the average agricultural worker 
earns $11.30 per hour.236 
In theory, there has been a cap of 85,000 H-1B visas for skilled 
temporary workers issued per year since 2005, which includes 20,000 
visas for workers with graduate degrees from U.S. academic 
institutions.  Over 1.8 million H-1B visas were issued between 2001 
and 2015: half were issued to Indian nationals, while the majority of the 
remainder were issued to East Asians.237  Because these “temporary” 
visas allow workers to stay up to six years, there are about a half a 
million H-1B holders in the U.S.238  By comparison, the median length 
of time a U.S. worker stays at a job is 4.2 years.239  It is hard to 
understand how these workers are deemed “temporary” when they 
remain in jobs 30% longer than the median U.S. worker. 
                                                          
232. See id.  
233. Neil G. Ruiz & Jens Manuel Krogstad, East Coast and Texas Metros Had 
the Most H-1B Visas for Skilled Workers from 2010 to 2016, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/29/h-1b-visa-
approvals-by-us-metro-area/.  
234. Measures of Central Tendency for Wage Data, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/central.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).  
235. Adverse Effect Wage Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/adverse.cfm (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).  
236. Average Farm Worker Hourly Pay, PAYSCALE, 
https://www.payscale.com/research/US/Job=Farm_Worker/Hourly_Rate (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2019).  
237. Id.  
238. Daniel Costa & Jennifer Rosenbaum, Temporary Foreign Workers by the 
Numbers: New Estimates by Visa Classification. ECON. POLICY INST. (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-foreign-workers-by-the-numbers-new-
estimates-by-visa-classification/. 
239. Economic News Release: Employee Tenure Summary in 2018, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm.  
30
California Western Law Review, Vol. 56 [], No. 1, Art. 16
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/16
Zepeda camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/4/2020  10:31 AM 
2019] THE COSTS OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES 233 
Companies claim they cannot find American workers to hire for 
these skilled, high-paying jobs, yet one-quarter of the jobs H-1B visa 
holders have require only a two-year associate’s degree.240  
Furthermore, while companies claim it is difficult to find skilled 
workers, they have been reluctant to raise wages; real wages have 
remained stagnant for over forty years.241  As early as 2014, concerns 
were being raised that U.S. tech companies were using the H1-B visa 
program to replace American workers with cheaper foreign workers.242  
In other words, it is companies asking for temporary work visas for 
skilled workers who are taking jobs away from Americans: not 
unauthorized (or authorized) immigrants.  As an example, in 2019, 
Uber received approval for nearly 300 new H1-B visas and laid off 
nearly 400 (presumably non-H1-B) workers.243 
Why would companies preferentially hire workers on H-1B visas 
and other temporary visas over U.S. citizens or permanent residents?  
H-1B visa holders can only switch jobs if they find another sponsor, 
and their employers can fire them at will.244  In other words, it is 
difficult for H-1B workers to leave their jobs and their employers can 
dismiss them for any reason, and unless they find a new sponsor, they 
lose their visa status.245  The implication is that H1-B visa holders are 
unlikely to complain or try to organize because they could risk losing 
their jobs, and hence their visas.  These policies ensure a compliant 
“temporary” workforce.  It is as much a strategy for keeping workers 
                                                          
240. Neil G. Ruiz, Key Facts About the U.S. H-1B Visa Program, Fact Tank, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/27/key-facts-about-the-u-s-h-1b-visa-program/.   
241. Drew DeSilver, For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged 
in Decades, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/.  
242. See Tech Demands More H-B1 Visas as Critics Cry Foul, NBC (Apr. 10, 
2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/tech-demands-more-h-1b-
visas-critics-cry-foul-n77161.  
243. Ethan Baron, H-1B: Uber Snatches up More Foreign-Worker Visas as it 
Lays Off Hundreds of Employees, MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/17/h-1b-uber-snatches-up-more-foreign-
worker-visas-as-it-lays-off-hundreds-of-employees/.  
244. See Does the US Policy of “At Will” Employment Apply to H1B Visa 
Workers?, H1B.IO, https://www.h1b.io/blog/us-policy-will-employment-apply-h1b-
visa-workers/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).  
245. Id.  
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compliant as the threat of deportation is for undocumented workers in 
low-wage jobs. 
Furthermore, the path to citizenship for these “temporary” workers 
is so arduous and lengthy it is nearly impossible.246  For instance, for 
Indians with an H1-B visa, the wait time is estimated at 151 years.247  
Between 67% to 72% of all H1-B visas have gone to Indians in the last 
five fiscal years.248  So while the four million workers and their families 
are counted in the Census for purposes of determining Congressional 
representatives, they cannot vote and for most, there is no path to 
citizenship.249  Thus, they have no say in the policies that affect them. 
This is simply another manifestation of voter suppression. 
In sum, U.S. policy regarding temporary visa holders benefits 
companies; suppresses the ability of workers to complain, organize, and 
earn a decent wage; and it derogates democratic principles by creating 
a class of residents who are unable to vote. 
CONCLUSION 
Many myths have shaped the U.S.’s current immigration policies 
and their implementation.  The most significant of these myths is that 
the U.S. is being overrun by immigrants crossing its southern border 
illegally.  However, the number of illegal border crossings has been 
plummeting since the year 2000.250  In FY 2017, CBP reported that it 
apprehended 310,531 people,251 reflecting the lowest number of illegal 
border crossings since before 1970.252  It is worth repeating: we are at 
                                                          
246. See Deborah Dsouza, H-1B Visa to Green Card Backlog: Why Tech 
Companies Demand Change, Investopedia (May 17, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/h-1b-visa-to-green-card-why-tech-companies-
demand-change-4580110.  
247. Id.  
248. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, 72% of H-1B Visas for Indians, ECON. TIMES 
(Jul. 23, 2019), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/visa-and-immigration/72-
of-h-1b-visas-for-indians/articleshow/70338671.cms?from=mdr.  
249. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 65; 
see also id.  
250. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 103.  
251. DHS Announces Progress in Enforcing Immigration Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/12/05/dhs-
announces-progress-enforcing-immigration-laws-protecting-americans. 
252. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 103.  
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a 48-year low in illegal border crossings.  The insistence of the U.S. 
government in focusing on a problem that does not exist calls to mind 
Arendt’s assertion that “[f]actuality itself depends . . . upon the 
existence of the nontotalitarian world.”253 
Another myth is that U.S. immigration policies are anti-immigrant.  
With four million temporary visa holders mostly from South and East 
Asia,254 over 700,000 illegal overstays annually (mostly not from 
Mexico and Central America),255 and only 310,531 annual illegal 
border crossings,256 the enforcement of U.S. immigration policy is not 
anti-immigrant: it is anti-Mexican, anti-Central American, and 
opportunistically anti-Muslim.257  It is also highly gendered.  Since 
1998, the number of women deported has remained stable, but the 
number of men has skyrocketed.258  Nearly the entire increase in 
deportations since 2003 is attributable to Mexican and Central 
American men.  One can interpret DHS’s enforcement of U.S. 
immigration policy through the lens that “[t]he task of the totalitarian 
police is not to discover new crimes, but . . . to arrest a certain category 
of the population.”259  With respect to immigration enforcement, that 
“category of population” is Hispanic and male. 
While executive orders have certainly affected the implementation 
of immigration policies, one of the largest myths about immigration 
policy is that Congress does not have anything to do with it.  
Conversely, Congress could do a lot: they could repeal and reverse prior 
legislation that has caused mass detention and deportations targeting 
Mexicans and Central Americans.  The increase in deportations started 
because of two laws passed by Congress in 1996: AEDPA and 
                                                          
253. HANNAH ARENDT, TOTALITARIANISM: PART THREE OF THE ORIGINS OF 
TOTALITARIANISM 86 (1968).   
254. Ruiz, supra note 239.  
255. Passel & Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips, supra note 29.  
256. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 95.  
257. Such as, with implementation of refugee resettlement and attempts at travel 
bans. The Muslim and Refugee Ban, ARAB AM. INST., 
https://www.aaiusa.org/the_muslim_and_refugee_ban (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).  
258. See generally Golash-Boza, Mass Incarceration and Mass Deportation, 
supra note 28, at 490.  
259. ARENDT, supra note 253, at 124.  
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IIRIRA.260  These two laws expanded the grounds for deportation, 
narrowed the grounds for appeal, and increased funding for law 
enforcement.  Repealing these laws would reduce mass detention and 
deportation. 
Subsequent congressional actions increased funding and imposed 
mandates on detentions and deportations.  This resulted in more people 
being deported from the U.S. since 1997 than all the years prior to 1997 
(five million).261  IIRIRA allowed for expedited removal without a 
hearing for those entering a U.S. Port of Entry who lack proper 
documentation and do not express fear of return.262  In 1998, the year it 
was implemented, expedited removals rose to 43% of all removals.  
IIRIRA demonstrates Congress’s willingness to abdicate its 
responsibilities: it gave the executive branch discretion to apply 
expedited removal to those apprehended in the interior within two years 
of entry. 
In 2005, Congress further increased the use of immigration policy 
to target Mexicans and Central America men by passing legislation that 
expanded expedited removals from Ports of Entry to within 100 miles 
of the border.  When this change was implemented, only 10% of 
expedited removals were inland and 90% were at Ports of Entry.  By 
FY 2014, inland expedited removals rose to 80% and 20% for Ports of 
Entry.  In FY 2013, 98% of those in expedited removals were Mexicans 
or Central Americans.263  The effect of this policy is to target Hispanics. 
Increasing funding to CBP and ICE has enabled the implementation 
of these racist policies.  DHS’s FY 2019 budget to apprehend, detain, 
and remove unauthorized immigrants is over $30 billion.264  This has 
resulted in an over 5,000% increase in the average estimated 
                                                          
260. Golash-Boza, Mass Incarceration and Mass Deportation, supra note 28, 
at 486.  
261. Id. at 484.  
262. Cassidy & Lynch, supra note 50, at 11.  
263. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, REPORT OF THE DHS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON FAMILY RESIDENTIAL CENTERS 2–3 (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-
16093.pdf.   
264. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 
1. 
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apprehension cost from FY 1990 to FY 2017.265  Furthermore, ICE 
estimates the cost of detention is $52,990 per person per year.266  The 
effect of these costly policies is to deport mostly Mexicans and Central 
Americans, who incidentally, are far less likely to commit crimes than 
U.S. citizens.  At the same time, DHS has ignored the much larger 
problem of overstays by people who mostly are not Mexican or Central 
American.  The size of the DHS budget and its workforce has enabled 
normalization of policies that target detention and deportation of 
Mexican and Central Americans, reminding us that people are “capable 
of even greater crimes than so-called professional criminals, provided 
only that these crimes [a]re well organized and assume[] the appearance 
of routine jobs.”267 
The economic beneficiaries of racist and misguided U.S. 
immigration policies are not just those employed to enforce the policies.  
Private companies, non-profits, and state and local governments have 
made money by providing detention facilities.  Profits due to U.S. 
immigration policies have flowed more broadly to sectors of the 
economy that depend on undocumented labor and on legal “temporary” 
workers.  The enforcement of immigration policies that target Mexicans 
and Central Americans has created greater vulnerability among a 
workforce that is already exploited.  At the other end of the job 
spectrum, H-1B visas have the same impact of creating a workforce that 
is vulnerable and compliant.  These workers can be dismissed at will 
and are at risk of losing their visas should they complain.  Thus, 
immigration policies and enforcement have enabled the exploitation of 
immigrant workers within low-paying, as well as high-paying, jobs.  
Clearly, creating vulnerability and fostering compliance within sectors 
of the labor force adversely affects all workers and benefits companies.  
This could explain why we have the immigration policies and 
enforcement that we have: they are profitable for corporations. 
What is striking about U.S. immigration policies is how wasteful 
and costly they are.  The cost of apprehension has risen astronomically 
because both the numbers of people crossing illegally has radically 
                                                          
265. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, Border Patrol Budget, supra note 105; 
see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 91.  
266. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 1, 
at 36.  
267. ARENDT, supra note 253, at 35. 
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declined and the budgets of CBP have risen.  The money thrown at 
private companies and state and county jails for detention is not justified 
given the high court appearance rates of unauthorized immigrants and 
the low-cost alternatives to detention.  Anti-immigrant rhetoric 
provides cover to make taxpayers bear the high costs of anti-Mexican, 
anti-Central American enforcement of immigration policies. 
Even larger are the costs that families of unauthorized immigrants 
bear: legal expenses, lost income from detained or deported family 
members, and broken families.  The legacy of our current policies is the 
generation of U.S. children whose fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, 
and friends have been detained and deported.  History will hear their 
voices. 
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